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About Storm Women's Hockey - Storm Women's Ice Hockey - What Happened To Will Robinson

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1998 Storm 2 A/B - est. Check out the SSWHL website for more specific information. Aviva Premiership Rugby. Regardless of the league or tournament, Crush players prioritize safety while preserving the passion and physical competitiveness of the game. The development would remove all the buildings on the former South Shore Marina site and replace them with five buildings, a restaurant and marina. Bridgewater Lumberjacks. She has worked in the county's personnel department for 7 ½ years, the story says. Be specific when making connections; identify the cause and effect. Communication Guidelines. About Storm Women's Hockey - Storm Women's Ice Hockey. The Malta Food Fest is on later this week, the Saratogian is reporting. Matthew J. Lee/Globe Staff. Deutsche Eishockey Liga.

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U. S. Junior Hockey. Gambrinus Liga (Czech Republic). Current Teams: Storm- est. KBO League (Korean Baseball). A developer is proposing a condominium project along the south shore of Saratoga Lake, the Albany Business Journal reported on Friday. Canadian Lacrosse League. The Lovell Group has perennially fielded one of the top programs in the E9 for the last 10 years with the Boston Advantage. Chinese Basketball Association. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc. Fall Experimental Football League. New York-Penn League. South shore women's hockey league salary. Below is a list of leagues offered for Spring 2023. The league may also reach out to form "at-large" teams from available players once the season starts.

95 Men's Electrify $21. NCAA Hockey Conferences. That said, no team can run entirely on passion. Exercise discipline. South shore women's hockey league boston. Register with USA Hockey: Click here to obtain your annual membership. The New England Knights will be led by a renowned coaching staff and skills directors; including Joe Lovell, Tim Lovell and Chris England Knights. 95 Brushed Cotton $19. South American Football. If you are interested in playing, supporting, or would like further information, please contact a captain. United States Hockey League. We are a member of USA Hockey and Mass Hockey, and have teams playing in most divisions of the South Shore Women's Hockey League (SSWHL).

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•Team Captains: • Rebecca Koke Email: • Pattyanne Lyons. Federation Québecoise du Sport. American Colleges - NCAA. Minor League Basketball. 95 Face-Off SS Hoodie 2. South shore women's hockey league ey league 1999 2007. Federation Internationale de Basket-ball. British Columbia Hockey League. Two teams from the South Shore Women's Hockey League - Randolph and the Shamrocks - recently faced off against each other at the Metropolis Skating Rink in Canton. Good communication leads to better team chemistry and better play. The Storm began in 1993 as a summer league team called Pond Scum, with most of the players coming from the Framingham program. Engage Rugby Super League.

United Shore Professional Baseball League. Arena/Indoor Football. Via the Partnership Fund, the proceeds support technology education in the county. Professional Basketball. NCAA Division III Conferences. Swedish Hockey League.

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No labeling or judgments. Réseau du sport étudiant du Québec. No "Always"/"Never" statements. Major League Lacrosse. C Division: Established players, some may have past college, club, or competitive high school experience but graduated at least 10 years ago. Latvian Higher League (Virslīga). Premier Hockey Federation. Jan. 25: Hockey in Placid; Condos on Saratoga Lake. Additionally, the team participates in various, optional tournaments before, during and after the league season. Professional Lacrosse League. For full teams, we offer BYOT Leagues as well as tournaments that span from Boston to Canada. Atlantic Coast Hockey League. Are you the administrator of this organization? Attention SSWHL members and teams!!

Australian Baseball League. Extraliga ledního hokeje, ELH (Czech Extraliga). Please note: does not own any of the team, league or event logos/uniforms depicted within this site, we do not have the power to grant usage rights to anyone. If you want to support the team, consider making a donation or coming to a game!

NBA Gatorade League. Senior Pro Baseball Association. Since joining the league, the Storm organization has become well-established and has increased to currently having multiple teams that play in most divisions of the league. Boston Women's Outdoor Field Hockey Leagues | BSSC. Ligue Nord-Américaine de Hockey. SportsEngine Inc. ©2023. BSSC manages the largest adult recreational field hockey program in the area. International Basketball. Register as a 4-person team, a 2-person pair, a single player (we'll hook up you up with some fun people!

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Idaho Code § 18- 8002(7) (1987 & 1991); Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P. 2d 401, 403 (1988). In Alabama, "actual physical control" was initially defined as "exclusive physical power, and present ability, to operate, move, park, or direct whatever use or non-use is to be made of the motor vehicle at the moment. " Superior Court for Greenlee County, 153 Ariz. 2d at 152 (citing Zavala, 136 Ariz. Mr. robinson was quite ill recently done. 2d at 459). We have no such contrary indications here, so we examine the ordinary meaning of "actual physical control. "

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By using the word "actual, " the legislature implied a current or imminent restraining or directing influence over a vehicle. Comm'r, 425 N. 2d 370 (N. 1988), in turn quoting Martin v. Really going to miss you smokey robinson. Commissioner of Public Safety, 358 N. 2d 734, 737 ()); see also Berger v. District of Columbia, 597 A. Statutory language, whether plain or not, must be read in its context. The Supreme Court of Ohio, for example, defined "actual physical control" as requiring that "a person be in the driver's seat of a vehicle, behind the steering wheel, in possession of the ignition key, and in such condition that he is physically capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move. "

Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So. FN6] Still, some generalizations are valid. As long as a person is physically or bodily able to assert dominion in the sense of movement by starting the car and driving away, then he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving it. Those were the facts in the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Gore v. State, 74 143, 536 A. One can discern a clear view among a few states, for example, that "the purpose of the 'actual physical control' offense is [as] a preventive measure, " State v. Schuler, 243 N. W. 2d 367, 370 (N. D. 1976), and that " 'an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public. ' The Arizona Court of Appeals has since clarified Zavala by establishing a two-part test for relinquishing "actual physical control"--a driver must "place his vehicle away from the road pavement, outside regular traffic lanes, and... turn off the ignition so that the vehicle's engine is not running. Accordingly, the words "actual physical control, " particularly when added by the legislature in the disjunctive, indicate an intent to encompass activity different than, and presumably broader than, driving, operating, or moving the vehicle. Mr. robinson was quite ill recently released. Further, when interpreting a statute, we assume that the words of the statute have their ordinary and natural meaning, absent some indication to the contrary. 2d 701, 703 () (citing State v. Purcell, 336 A. For the intoxicated person caught between using his vehicle for shelter until he is sober or using it to drive home, [prior precedent] encourages him to attempt to quickly drive home, rather than to sleep it off in the car, where he will be a beacon to police. It is important to bear in mind that a defendant who is not in "actual physical control" of the vehicle at the time of apprehension will not necessarily escape arrest and prosecution for a drunk driving offense. State v. Ghylin, 250 N. 2d 252, 255 (N. 1977). This view, at least insofar as it excuses a drunk driver who was already driving but who subsequently relinquishes control, might be subject to criticism as encouraging drunk drivers to test their skills by attempting first to drive before concluding that they had better not. The question, of course, is "How much broader?

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Because of the varying tests and the myriad factual permutations, synthesizing or summarizing the opinions of other courts appears futile. The court said: "We can expect that most people realize, as they leave a tavern or party intoxicated, that they face serious sanctions if they drive. Balanced against these facts were the circumstances that the vehicle was legally parked, the ignition was off, and Atkinson was fast asleep. A person may also be convicted under § 21-902 if it can be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that before being apprehended he or she has actually driven, operated, or moved the vehicle while under the influence. Accordingly, a person is in "actual physical control" if the person is presently exercising or is imminently likely to exercise "restraining or directing influence" over a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. The policy of allowing an intoxicated individual to "sleep it off" in safety, rather than attempt to drive home, arguably need not encompass the privilege of starting the engine, whether for the sake of running the radio, air conditioning, or heater. The court reached this conclusion based on its belief that "it is reasonable to allow a driver, when he believes his driving is impaired, to pull completely off the highway, turn the key off and sleep until he is sober, without fear of being arrested for being in control. " The court defined "actual physical control" as " 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation, ' " and held that "the defendant at the time of his arrest was not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any dominion over it. " We do not believe the legislature meant to forbid those intoxicated individuals who emerge from a tavern at closing time on a cold winter night from merely entering their vehicles to seek shelter while they sleep off the effects of alcohol. It is "being in the driver's position of the motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving. " V. Sandefur, 300 Md. What may be an unduly broad extension of this "sleep it off" policy can be found in the Arizona Supreme Court's Zavala v. State, 136 Ariz. 356, 666 P. 2d 456 (1983), which not only encouraged a driver to "sleep it off" before attempting to drive, but also could be read as encouraging drivers already driving to pull over and sleep. As for the General Assembly's addition of the term "actual physical control" in 1969, we note that it is a generally accepted principle of statutory construction that a statute is to be read so that no word or phrase is "rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. " Quoting Hughes v. State, 535 P. 2d 1023, 1024 ()) (both cases involved defendant seated behind the steering wheel of vehicle parked partially in the roadway with the key in the ignition).
The court concluded that "while the defendant remained behind the wheel of the truck, the pulling off to the side of the road and turning off the ignition indicate that defendant voluntarily ceased to exercise control over the vehicle prior to losing consciousness, " and it reversed his conviction. Cagle v. City of Gadsden, 495 So. In sum, the primary focus of the inquiry is whether the person is merely using the vehicle as a stationary shelter or whether it is reasonable to assume that the person will, while under the influence, jeopardize the public by exercising some measure of control over the vehicle. The location of the vehicle can be a determinative factor in the inquiry because a person whose vehicle is parked illegally or stopped in the roadway is obligated by law to move the vehicle, and because of this obligation could more readily be deemed in "actual physical control" than a person lawfully parked on the shoulder or on his or her own property. 2d 1144, 1147 (Ala. 1986). See, e. g., State v. Woolf, 120 Idaho 21, 813 P. 2d 360, 362 () (court upheld magistrate's determination that defendant was in driver's position when lower half of defendant's body was on the driver's side of the front seat, his upper half resting across the passenger side). No one factor alone will necessarily be dispositive of whether the defendant was in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. What constitutes "actual physical control" will inevitably depend on the facts of the individual case. Webster's also defines "control" as "to exercise restraining or directing influence over. " We believe that the General Assembly, particularly by including the word "actual" in the term "actual physical control, " meant something more than merely sleeping in a legally parked vehicle with the ignition off. In Garcia, the court held that the defendant was in "actual physical control" and not a "passive occupant" when he was apprehended while in the process of turning the key to start the vehicle. See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Driving, Operating, or Being in Control of Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated Statute or Ordinance, 93 A. L. R. 3d 7 (1979 & 1992 Supp. We therefore join other courts which have rejected an inflexible test that would make criminals of all people who sit intoxicated in a vehicle while in possession of the vehicle's ignition keys, without regard to the surrounding circumstances.

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Most importantly, "actual" is defined as "present, " "current, " "existing in fact or reality, " and "in existence or taking place at the time. " Richmond v. State, 326 Md. We believe it would be preferable, and in line with legislative intent and social policy, to read more flexibility into [prior precedent]. Neither the statute's purpose nor its plain language supports the result that intoxicated persons sitting in their vehicles while in possession of their ignition keys would, regardless of other circumstances, always be subject to criminal penalty. Thus, rather than assume that a hazard exists based solely upon the defendant's presence in the vehicle, we believe courts must assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case. In view of the legal standards we have enunciated and the circumstances of the instant case, we conclude there was a reasonable doubt that Atkinson was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle, an essential element of the crime with which he was charged. In the instant case, stipulations that Atkinson was in the driver's seat and the keys were in the ignition were strong factors indicating he was in "actual physical control. "

Superior Court for Greenlee County, 153 Ariz. 119, 735 P. 2d 149, 152 (). Many of our sister courts have struggled with determining the exact breadth of conduct described by "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle, reaching varied results. Rather, each must be considered with an eye towards whether there is in fact present or imminent exercise of control over the vehicle or, instead, whether the vehicle is merely being used as a stationary shelter. Management Personnel Servs.

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The court set out a three-part test for obtaining a conviction: "1. Position of the person charged in the driver's seat, behind the steering wheel, and in such condition that, except for the intoxication, he or she is physically capable of starting the engine and causing the vehicle to move; 3. The danger is less than that involved when the vehicle is actually moving; however, the danger does exist and the degree of danger is only slightly less than when the vehicle is moving. In this instance, the context is the legislature's desire to prevent intoxicated individuals from posing a serious public risk with their vehicles. Courts pursuing this deterrence-based policy generally adopt an extremely broad view of "actual physical control. " As a practical matter, we recognize that any definition of "actual physical control, " no matter how carefully considered, cannot aspire to cover every one of the many factual variations that one may envision. 3] We disagree with this construction of "actual physical control, " which we consider overly broad and excessively rigid. 2d 407, 409 (D. C. 1991) (stating in dictum that "[e]ven a drunk with the ignition keys in his pocket would be deemed sufficiently in control of the vehicle to warrant conviction. We believe that, by using the term "actual physical control, " the legislature intended to differentiate between those inebriated people who represent no threat to the public because they are only using their vehicles as shelters until they are sober enough to drive and those people who represent an imminent threat to the public by reason of their control of a vehicle. Even the presence of such a statutory definition has failed to settle the matter, however. 2d 735 (1988), discussed supra, where the court concluded that evidence of the ignition key in the "on" position, the glowing alternator/battery light, the gear selector in "drive, " and the warm engine, sufficiently supported a finding that the defendant had actually driven his car shortly before the officer's arrival.

Id., 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P. 2d at 443 (citations omitted and emphasis in original). For example, on facts much akin to those of the instant case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that a defendant who was found unconscious in his vehicle parked some twenty feet off the highway with the engine off, the lights off, and the key in the ignition but off, was in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. Other factors may militate against a court's determination on this point, however. In those rare instances where the facts show that a defendant was furthering the goal of safer highways by voluntarily 'sleeping it off' in his vehicle, and that he had no intent of moving the vehicle, trial courts should be allowed to find that the defendant was not 'in actual physical control' of the vehicle.... ". The engine was off, although there was no indication as to whether the keys were in the ignition or not.

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Perhaps the strongest factor informing this inquiry is whether there is evidence that the defendant started or attempted to start the vehicle's engine. In these states, the "actual physical control" language is construed as intending "to deter individuals who have been drinking intoxicating liquor from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers. " The inquiry must always take into account a number of factors, however, including the following: 1) whether or not the vehicle's engine is running, or the ignition on; 2) where and in what position the person is found in the vehicle; 3) whether the person is awake or asleep; 4) where the vehicle's ignition key is located; 5) whether the vehicle's headlights are on; 6) whether the vehicle is located in the roadway or is legally parked. Emphasis in original). Indeed, once an individual has started the vehicle, he or she has come as close as possible to actually driving without doing so and will generally be in "actual physical control" of the vehicle. In State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P. 2d 442 (1971), the defendant was discovered asleep in his automobile which was parked on the shoulder of the road, completely off the travel portion of the highway. While we wish to discourage intoxicated individuals from first testing their drunk driving skills before deciding to pull over, this should not prevent us from allowing people too drunk to drive, and prudent enough not to try, to seek shelter in their cars within the parameters we have described above. As we have already said with respect to the legislature's 1969 addition of "actual physical control" to the statute, we will not read a statute to render any word superfluous or meaningless. Active or constructive possession of the vehicle's ignition key by the person charged or, in the alternative, proof that such a key is not required for the vehicle's operation; 2. City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 Ohio St. 2d 94, 351 N. E. 2d 85, 87- 88 (1976) (footnote omitted), cert. This view appears to stem from the belief that " '[a]n intoxicated person in a motor vehicle poses a threat to public safety because he "might set out on an inebriated journey at any moment. "

Adams v. State, 697 P. 2d 622, 625 (Wyo. Webster's also contrasts "actual" with "potential and possible" as well as with "hypothetical. In Zavala, an officer discovered the defendant sitting unconscious in the driver's seat of his truck, with the key in the ignition, but off. In the words of a dissenting South Dakota judge, this construction effectively creates a new crime, "Parked While Intoxicated. " Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1706 (1986) defines "physical" as "relating to the body... often opposed to mental. " The court said: "An intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of an automobile is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public. Thus, we must give the word "actual" some significance.

As long as such individuals do not act to endanger themselves or others, they do not present the hazard to which the drunk driving statute is directed. When the occupant is totally passive, has not in any way attempted to actively control the vehicle, and there is no reason to believe that the inebriated person is imminently going to control the vehicle in his or her condition, we do not believe that the legislature intended for criminal sanctions to apply.